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Advisories / SA-2026-008
SA-2026-008: The deploy job ran repository code with Pages and OIDC rights
| Severity | medium |
| Status | fixed |
| Weakness | CWE-250 |
| Component | .github/workflows/pages.yml |
| Found by | security@php.newsroom |
| Found | 2026-10-22 |
| Fixed in | v0.5.5 |
| Fixed by | security@php.newsroom |
What it is
One job ran validate.py, which runs build.py, with pages: write and id-token: write.
What an attacker could do
Any push could run code holding the right to deploy and to mint an OIDC token.
How: Edit build.py to use the token; push to dev.
Root cause
Build and deploy shared one job and one permission set.
What contributed
- The Pages starter workflow puts permissions at the top level.
What was not in place
Separation of the job that runs code from the job that deploys.
The fix
The gate job is read-only and uploads the artifact; only the deploy job, which runs no repository code, holds the rights.
What prevents it now
Pinned actions and persist-credentials: false.