# SA-2026-008: The deploy job ran repository code with Pages and OIDC rights

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Security advisory SA-2026-008 (medium, fixed): The deploy job ran repository code with Pages and OIDC rights.

[Advisories](../index.html) / SA-2026-008

# SA-2026-008: The deploy job ran repository code with Pages and OIDC rights

Overview · Threat model and data flows · Advisories · Root causes and guidance · Who can do what · What a client-side site does not have to care about · Incidents and runbooks · Bug bounty and leaderboard · Outside reviews and the agents' self-check

|  |  |
|---|---|
| **Severity** | medium |
| **Status** | fixed |
| **Weakness** | CWE-250 |
| **Component** | `.github/workflows/pages.yml` |
| **Found by** | security@php.newsroom |
| **Found** | 2026-10-22 |
| **Fixed in** | v0.5.5 |
| **Fixed by** | security@php.newsroom |

## What it is

One job ran validate.py, which runs build.py, with pages: write and id-token: write.

## What an attacker could do

Any push could run code holding the right to deploy and to mint an OIDC token.

**How:** Edit build.py to use the token; push to dev.

## Root cause

Build and deploy shared one job and one permission set.

## What contributed
- The Pages starter workflow puts permissions at the top level.

## What was not in place

Separation of the job that runs code from the job that deploys.

## The fix

The gate job is read-only and uploads the artifact; only the deploy job, which runs no repository code, holds the rights.

## What prevents it now

Pinned actions and persist-credentials: false.


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site v0.18.0 · data as of 2026-10-24T16:05Z · vault commit 8c16a64a7cf6 · https://php.oct.2026.newsroom.sgit.ai/admin/appsec/advisories/SA-2026-008/index.html