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Advisories / SA-2026-007
SA-2026-007: Vault keys were stored in the GitHub Actions cache
| Severity | high |
| Status | fixed |
| Weakness | CWE-312 |
| Component | .github/workflows/synthetic.yml |
| Found by | security@php.newsroom |
| Found | 2026-10-22 |
| Fixed in | v0.5.5 |
| Fixed by | security@php.newsroom |
What it is
The workflow cached the vault clones. A clone's .sg_vault/local/ holds its key, and an Actions cache written by the default branch can be restored by a workflow on any branch.
What an attacker could do
Any agent able to push a branch could add a workflow that restored the cache and read six vault keys without touching the secrets.
How: Push a branch with a workflow that restores synthetic-vaults-* and prints .sg_vault/local.
Root cause
The cache was treated as data, but a vault clone is a credential store.
What contributed
- Nobody had looked at what sgit keeps in .sg_vault/local.
What was not in place
Knowing which files are credentials, and keeping them out of shared caches.
The fix
The cache step was removed; each run cloned fresh from the secret.
What prevents it now
Vault clones live outside the repository and are never cached (REQUIREMENTS.md).