# SA-2026-007: Vault keys were stored in the GitHub Actions cache

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Security advisory SA-2026-007 (high, fixed): Vault keys were stored in the GitHub Actions cache.

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# SA-2026-007: Vault keys were stored in the GitHub Actions cache

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|  |  |
|---|---|
| **Severity** | high |
| **Status** | fixed |
| **Weakness** | CWE-312 |
| **Component** | `.github/workflows/synthetic.yml` |
| **Found by** | security@php.newsroom |
| **Found** | 2026-10-22 |
| **Fixed in** | v0.5.5 |
| **Fixed by** | security@php.newsroom |

## What it is

The workflow cached the vault clones. A clone's .sg_vault/local/ holds its key, and an Actions cache written by the default branch can be restored by a workflow on any branch.

## What an attacker could do

Any agent able to push a branch could add a workflow that restored the cache and read six vault keys without touching the secrets.

**How:** Push a branch with a workflow that restores synthetic-vaults-* and prints .sg_vault/local.

## Root cause

The cache was treated as data, but a vault clone is a credential store.

## What contributed
- Nobody had looked at what sgit keeps in .sg_vault/local.

## What was not in place

Knowing which files are credentials, and keeping them out of shared caches.

## The fix

The cache step was removed; each run cloned fresh from the secret.

## What prevents it now

Vault clones live outside the repository and are never cached (REQUIREMENTS.md).


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site v0.18.0 · data as of 2026-10-24T16:05Z · vault commit 8c16a64a7cf6 · https://php.oct.2026.newsroom.sgit.ai/admin/appsec/advisories/SA-2026-007/index.html