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Advisories / SA-2026-026
SA-2026-026: Readers' keys on the shared origin: /now/ and the Ask pane
| Severity | medium |
| Status | mitigated |
| Weakness | CWE-922 |
| Component | assets/now/now.js, assets/ask/ask.js |
| Found by | security@php.newsroom |
| Found | 2026-10-22 |
| Fixed in | not yet |
What it is
The reader's vault key is kept in sessionStorage, and in localStorage when "remember" is ticked; the vault holds the OpenRouter key and the SG/Send access token. A vault someone hands the reader can supply its own OpenRouter key and model settings.
What an attacker could do
Any script on the origin reads the key (now blocked by the CSP); a malicious vault routes the reader's chats through an account its author can see.
How: Public in outline.
Root cause
Secrets for one app share an origin with every page.
What contributed
- The phone app and the Ask pane grew fast.
What was not in place
An origin of its own for secret-holding apps.
What would fix it
Move /now/ and the Ask pane to a subdomain; confirm before adopting a vault's key or model; allow-list model ids.