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Advisories / SA-2026-021
SA-2026-021: The vault app: prototype pollution and javascript: links from vault data
| Severity | medium |
| Status | fixed |
| Weakness | CWE-1321 |
| Component | vault-app/src/index.html.tpl |
| Found by | security@php.newsroom (pass 3 review) |
| Found | 2026-10-24 |
| Fixed in | v0.14.26 |
| Fixed by | security@php.newsroom |
What it is
Filter presets built from vault values were parsed and merged with Object.assign for every key, __proto__ included, polluting objects later written into markup. Source URLs went into href with no scheme check.
What an attacker could do
Script inside the vault app, with read access to the vault's files (it has no CSP).
How: A vault writer adds a source kind or agent name that breaks out of the preset JSON.
Root cause
Merging untrusted objects without a key allow-list.
What contributed
- The vault app runs on another origin, outside this site's CSP and gate.
What was not in place
Allow-listed merges; URL scheme checks in every renderer.
The fix
Presets keep only the four views' known filters with string or null values; source links are http(s) only.
What prevents it now
Proposed: a CSP for the vault app.