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Advisories / SA-2026-005
SA-2026-005: The gate missed most secret formats and never read history
| Severity | medium |
| Status | fixed |
| Weakness | CWE-693 |
| Component | admin/build/validate.py |
| Found by | security@php.newsroom |
| Found | 2026-10-22 |
| Fixed in | v0.5.5 |
| Fixed by | security@php.newsroom |
What it is
The credential check matched sk-, ghp_ and a few shapes. It missed Anthropic keys (sk-ant-...), OpenRouter, fine-grained GitHub tokens, SG/Send tokens, JWTs and Google keys, and it scanned only the current tree.
What an attacker could do
A leaked key in one of those formats would have been published by a release that said "no credential shapes".
How: An agent pastes a token into a data file or a log; the release passes.
Root cause
The scanner was written for the secrets the first author knew about.
What contributed
- The site publishes the whole repository, so any committed file is public within minutes.
What was not in place
A maintained list of secret shapes, the values of the environment's own secrets, and a history scan.
The fix
security_check.py: wide secret shapes, the literal values of the session's secret variables, sensitive file paths, and --history over every commit.
What prevents it now
Run by the gate, by the release tripwire on the staged diff, and on every security pass.