Research collected from outside sources and what this site derives from them; every fact links to a saved copy of its source Research or story?
Risks / R02 The coordinated disclosure broke before the fix was ready / R02-3
R02-3: Patched builds published before the embargo lifted
Because built images containing the fix were published at 07:41 UTC on 21 October, before the release, anyone could diff them against the previous images, resulting in the fix itself becoming a map to the flaw.
Rating 16 high · Likelihood 4 Likely · Impact 4 Major · Kind Supply chain · Acceptance not recorded
Basis. Disputed: the Foundation says Chainguard broke the embargo; Chainguard denies leaking.
The path
Who carries it
One risk, assigned to every stakeholder that carries part of it, with the part each plays.
| Stakeholder | Part | Why | Its register |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chainguard | source | Published the images, by the Foundation's account. | 1 risk |
| Distributors and packagers | owner | Every builder in an embargo can do the same. | 3 risks |
| The PHP security team | regulator | Sets the embargo's terms. | 7 risks |
What it arises from
- One embargo shared by many parties. Four independent finders, a coalition, early advice to critical infrastructure and image builders: every party is a place the secret can leave by.
The evidence
Treatments
| Treatment | Status | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Embargo terms that cover built artefacts, not only advisories | missing | How the coordinated disclosure broke |
The standards that govern it
| Framework | Control | What it asks | Family |
|---|---|---|---|
| ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111 | 29147:coordination | Coordinating disclosure with other vendors and parties under embargo | Practice and technique |
| Cyber Resilience Act | Art.13 | Obligations of manufacturers, including due diligence on integrated third-party and open-source components | Law and regulation |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | GV.SC-05 | Supply chain requirements are established and integrated into contracts | Frameworks and control catalogues |
| OWASP Top 10s | A03:2025 | Software supply chain failures | Practice and technique |
The stories that tell it
- Where php2shell stands: many sites dark, millions of attempts, no confirmed breach
- php2shell in perspective: an old embargo model, a Log4Shell shape, and the shrinking gap between theory and proof (through The coordinated disclosure broke before the fix was ready)
On this site: How the coordinated disclosure broke