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Risks / R01 Remote code execution on internet-facing PHP servers / R01-5

R01-5: Popular applications compromised before authentication

Because pre-authentication code execution was reported against WordPress, Drupal, Joomla, MediaWiki, Magento, Nextcloud and other applications, their users are exposed whatever the application's own security, resulting in the largest share of affected sites.

Rating 15 high · Likelihood 3 Possible · Impact 5 Severe · Kind Security · Acceptance not recorded

Basis. Reported by the finders; the applications inherit the flaw from the engine.

The path

Told inWhere php2shell standsWhere php2shell stan…Patch at the speed of MetasploitPatch at the speed o…Acted on byWebsite ownerWebsite ownerStory site agentStory site agentJournalistJournalistCarried byOpen-source PHP applications (informer)Open-source PHP appl…Website owner (owner)Website owner (owner…Online shops and payments (bearer)Online shops and pay…RiskR01-5 Popular applications compromised before authenticationR01-5 Popular applic…Arises fromThe allocator's longjmp-based bailout on out-of-memoryThe allocator's long…Request globals that survive a failed requestRequest globals that…VulnerabilityCVE-2026-109618CVE-2026-109618CVE-2026-109619CVE-2026-109619Fixed byA soft memory limit that no longer jumpsA soft memory limit …A hard limit that ends the process cleanlyA hard limit that en…An orderly unwind at the next safe pointAn orderly unwind at…Allocations that may fail instead of abortAllocations that may…Request globals reset so nothing survives a failureRequest globals rese…Bounded, deduplicated request parsingBounded, deduplicate…CodeZend/zend_alloc.cZend/zend_alloc.cZend/zend_execute_API.cZend/zend_execute_AP…Zend/zend_hash.cZend/zend_hash.cZend/zend_string.cZend/zend_string.cZend/zend_types.hZend/zend_types.hext/session/session.cext/session/session.…main/SAPI.cmain/SAPI.cmain/main.cmain/main.cmain/rfc1867.cmain/rfc1867.c
The risk sits in the middle. To its left, the stories that tell it, the roles and team members that act on it, and every stakeholder that carries part of it. To its right, what it arises from, the vulnerability behind that, the part of the fix that addresses it and the code the fix changed. Every line is an edge in the graph; every node is a link; hover for the full name. Vulnerabilities, stories and team members include those of the risk this one is part of; roles include those of the risks above and beneath it.

Who carries it

One risk, assigned to every stakeholder that carries part of it, with the part each plays.

StakeholderPartWhyIts register
Open-source PHP applicationsinformerCan only tell their users to update PHP; their advisories reach the people who must act.1 risk
Website ownerownerRuns the application.2 risks
Online shops and paymentsbearerMagento and WooCommerce shops take cards.2 risks

What it arises from

The evidence

Treatments

TreatmentStatusWhere
Update PHP under the applicationin placeIf you run PHP: the steps, in order, with their sources

The standards that govern it

FrameworkControlWhat it asksFamily
OWASP Top 10sA06:2021Vulnerable and outdated componentsPractice and technique
PCI DSS6.3.1Security vulnerabilities are identified, risk-ranked and managedManagement-system standards
CIS Controls16.4Establish and manage an inventory of third-party software componentsFrameworks and control catalogues

The stories that tell it

On this site: Affected systems: versions, deployments, applications, inventory