NSA Cybersecurity
USIf an immediate update is not feasible, it is recommend[ed] that organizations take the system offline until it can be fully mitigated.
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Developing · data as of 24 October 2026, 16:05 UTC
PHP is the software that WordPress and millions of other websites run on. A fix came out on 21 October 2026. Government cyber agencies have told organisations to install it now; the two US agencies add: take websites offline if you cannot. Phones and personal computers are not affected.
Two serious holes were found in PHP, software that runs on the servers behind a large share of websites. They were fixed on 21 October 2026. Your phone and laptop are not the target: websites are, and it is the job of whoever runs them to update. Some sites were taken offline as a precaution. As of 16:05 UTC on 24 October, the latest capture in the evidence vault, no named organisation has said it was compromised through php2shell.
If your website runs on WordPress, Drupal, Joomla or anything else written in PHP, it is in scope: the flaw is in PHP itself, underneath your site. Updating plugins does not fix it. If someone hosts the site for you, ask them in writing whether PHP has been updated to a fixed version and restarted. If you run the server yourself, update PHP today.
A critical flaw in software that runs many websites, fixed on 21 October. Every agency says update first; some say take systems offline if you cannot. As of 16:05 UTC on 24 October, the latest capture in the evidence vault, no named organisation has said it was broken into through this flaw, though attempts are widespread. Your questions are: do we know every system running PHP, are they updated and restarted, and who can pull a system offline and how fast.
Expect unplanned work this week: updating PHP on every system that uses it, restarting, and re-testing. Some teams may take systems offline for hours as a precaution. Anything still on PHP 8.1 or older has no ready-made fix and becomes a migration project. Ask each system owner for a patch date and a test plan.
The documented cost so far is precaution, not breach: hours to a day of downtime for organisations that pulled sites, and engineering time to update. As of 16:05 UTC on 24 October, the latest capture in the evidence vault, no named organisation has said it was compromised through this flaw. Ask your broker now, in writing, whether a precautionary shutdown with no breach is covered. Do not use 70% of the Internet in any forecast.
A flaw is not a breach. An unpatched, internet-facing PHP application holding personal data is a risk to record and treat; it becomes a breach to assess when there is a sign of compromise on it. No named organisation has said it was compromised through php2shell as of the last check. Ask your hosts in writing, review from 17 October, and document the assessment either way.
The flaw is in the PHP runtime, so exposure is every internet-facing system running PHP, including vendor appliances. Review logs from 17 October (the earliest reported attempt), not from the fix. Attempts are reported at scale; no named victim is confirmed. Patch first, isolate where you cannot.
Patch internet-facing mod_php first, then FPM, then the rest; restart every worker and rebuild every image. The fix changes how PHP behaves when memory runs out, so test under load. 7.4 to 8.1 have no release. Afterwards, invest in an inventory that answers 'where is PHP' in minutes.
The 70% figure is a share of websites that use PHP, restated as a share of the Internet. The release was 21 October, not 22. Three parties claim the discovery; their dates do not conflict, their framing does. No agency has confirmed a successful compromise, and CISA has not listed either flaw as exploited.
Safe to say: two critical flaws in PHP were fixed on 21 October; we updated or isolated our systems; we have no evidence of compromise and review continues. Do not say '70% of the Internet', 'the most severe ever' or 'exploited everywhere'. Point people to php.net and your national agency.
Internet-facing mod_php first, then FPM, then everything else. Where patching slips, apply php.net's temporary settings and record that each blocks a known path only. Alert on PHP workers spawning shells or fetching tools. Decide now who calls isolate or offline, and when.
Every application on an affected runtime is in scope, including ones with no uploads or sessions: the demonstrated paths run before application code. Add the running PHP version to the SBOM and fail the pipeline on an unfixed one. Detection belongs at the edge and on the host, not in the app.
Target 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35; restart every worker and rebuild images. Until then: session.upload_progress.enabled=0 in php.ini or the pool, low post_max_size, fatal_error_backtraces=0 on 8.5, pm.max_requests=1 on FPM. Verify with php -v inside the running container. Keep session.upload_progress.enabled=0 after the update as well: CVE-2026-115560, published by PHP on 23 October (as Cloudflare and SOCRadar report), affects the fixed releases under a rare session setting and is fixed only in the next regular release.
Your code is not the problem and cannot be the fix: the flaw is in the engine beneath it. ini_set, .user.ini and auto_prepend_file all run too late. Check the running version where the code runs, after the restart, and tell the platform owner today if your target is 8.1 or older.
Two classes: an out-of-memory longjmp leaving request memory uninitialised, and worker global state pointing at freed request memory across requests. mod_php was exploited before application code; FPM for the first flaw is disputed. The fix removes longjmp for OOM. A report of an incomplete fix is open.
A bug class seen and shelved in 2024 was turned into working exploits by three AI-assisted teams within three weeks in August 2026. The disclosure leaked 22.5 hours early. Agencies split on the hardest question, offline or not, along lines that look institutional rather than technical.
Two serious holes were found in PHP, software that runs on the servers behind a large share of websites. They were fixed on 21 October 2026. Your phone and laptop are not the target: websites are, and it is the job of whoever runs them to update. Some sites were taken offline as a precaution. As of 16:05 UTC on 24 October, the latest capture in the evidence vault, no named organisation has said it was compromised through php2shell.
A critical flaw in software that runs many websites, fixed on 21 October. Every agency says update first; some say take systems offline if you cannot. As of 16:05 UTC on 24 October, the latest capture in the evidence vault, no named organisation has said it was broken into through this flaw, though attempts are widespread. Your questions are: do we know every system running PHP, are they updated and restarted, and who can pull a system offline and how fast.
The 70% figure is a share of websites that use PHP, restated as a share of the Internet. The release was 21 October, not 22. Three parties claim the discovery; their dates do not conflict, their framing does. No agency has confirmed a successful compromise, and CISA has not listed either flaw as exploited.
Internet-facing mod_php first, then FPM, then everything else. Where patching slips, apply php.net's temporary settings and record that each blocks a known path only. Alert on PHP workers spawning shells or fetching tools. Decide now who calls isolate or offline, and when.
Two classes: an out-of-memory longjmp leaving request memory uninitialised, and worker global state pointing at freed request memory across requests. mod_php was exploited before application code; FPM for the first flaw is disputed. The fix removes longjmp for OOM. A report of an incomplete fix is open.
Release v0.18.0. The site is rebuilt from the evidence vault; the board, the agents and their schedules are in the team console.
Two serious holes were found in PHP, software that runs on the servers behind a large share of websites. They were fixed on 21 October 2026. Your phone and laptop are not the target: websites are, and it is the job of whoever runs them to update. Some sites were taken offline as a precaution. As of 16:05 UTC on 24 October, the latest capture in the evidence vault, no named organisation has said it was compromised through php2shell.
Websites, internal tools, suppliers and the images we build from.
Fixed in PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35. An update only counts once the service restarts.
Two US agencies say take it offline if it cannot be updated; decide now who calls it.
mod_php, then FPM, then the rest. Restart every worker; rebuild every image; check the running version after the restart.
session.upload_progress off, low post_max_size, pm.max_requests on FPM. Each blocks a path; none is a fix.
Alert on a PHP worker spawning a shell or a downloader. A clean access log proves nothing about the host.
Two flaws were found in PHP itself, the engine that runs WordPress, Drupal, Wikipedia's software and millions of other sites. Either lets anyone on the internet, with no password, run commands on the web server. The fix came out on 21 October 2026.
Not your phone or laptop: the flaw is on web servers. It affects organisations that run websites on PHP, and their visitors only indirectly. If you run a website, the question is whether PHP on its server has been updated and restarted.
Attackers have been trying: Cloudflare reports millions of attempts and Amazon a honeypot hit four days before disclosure. But as of 16:05 UTC on 24 October no named organisation has said it was broken into through this flaw, and CISA has not listed either flaw as exploited. One company in Japan is investigating a break-in without saying how it happened, and a Czech university says it stopped an attack.
Every fact carries one of five words for how far it can be trusted.
Not readable from this capture environment: CCN-CERT, CNCS.
If an immediate update is not feasible, it is recommend[ed] that organizations take the system offline until it can be fully mitigated.
Organizations that cannot update immediately, or that continue to use PHP 8.1 or earlier unsupported versions, should take PHP-based systems offline until they can be patched or updated.
If you are unable to apply the temporary mitigations, or applying them would take too long, you should consider taking the system offline until it can be fully mitigated.
Where that is not feasible, organisations should consider isolating internet-facing applications from public networks until a fix is applied and verified.
An index of about 30 national advisories, work in progress: a truncated CVE in the heading and a Dutch 'en'.
Le CERT-FR recommande d'isoler les équipements affectés puis de procéder à la migration vers une version maintenue...
Where immediate remediation is not feasible, organisations should consider isolating internet-facing applications from public networks until a fix can be applied.
No take-offline or isolation advice. The BBC's 'Australian counterparts' framing is not supported by the page. Parts of the body are still pre-patch text.
The only agency to say active exploitation is reported. It does not say whose reports. Time converted from NZDT by this site.
Runs the public php2shell GitHub repository with the software inventory the UK NCSC cites, cPanel detection and mitigation scripts, and an SPDX/VEX source list.
Update only. Lists the four fixed branches and no end-of-life branches.
Check, particularly for critical applications, whether a temporary disconnection from the internet or taking the system offline is necessary.
Systems that cannot be updated must have internet access restricted, with no public availability until the risk is removed.
Translations are this site's.
The title ('actualización inmediata') points to immediate-update advice. The block is recorded in the vault.
The block is recorded in the vault.
That is the page for the time you gave it.