# SA-2026-031: Secrets on command lines can reach public run logs

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Security advisory SA-2026-031 (medium, open): Secrets on command lines can reach public run logs.

[Advisories](../index.html) / SA-2026-031

# SA-2026-031: Secrets on command lines can reach public run logs

Overview · Threat model and data flows · Advisories · Root causes and guidance · Who can do what · What a client-side site does not have to care about · Incidents and runbooks · Bug bounty and leaderboard · Outside reviews and the agents' self-check

|  |  |
|---|---|
| **Severity** | medium |
| **Status** | open |
| **Weakness** | CWE-532 |
| **Component** | `postmaster.py, run.py, schedule.py run --log` |
| **Found by** | security@php.newsroom (pass 2 review) |
| **Found** | 2026-10-24 |
| **Fixed in** | not yet |

## What it is

Vault keys and tokens are passed to sgit on the command line; a failure prints the command; schedule.py run --log copies the last 6,000 characters of a log into a public run record.

## What an attacker could do

A vault key in a public file.

**How:** Public.

## Root cause

Secrets travel as arguments because the tool takes them that way.

## What contributed
- schedule.py's own secret check is narrower than the gate's.

## What was not in place

Secrets by stdin or file, and redaction before publishing.

## What would fix it

Pass secrets by stdin; catch and redact errors; reuse security_check's patterns in schedule.py.


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site v0.18.0 · data as of 2026-10-24T16:05Z · vault commit 8c16a64a7cf6 · https://php.oct.2026.newsroom.sgit.ai/admin/appsec/advisories/SA-2026-031/index.html